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Abstract: The consequences of ship collisions with an oil rig, offshore installation or platform can be far more expensive in relation to 
safety, environment and costs of damage. The damage due to a single incident of an Oil Rig Collision can be catastrophic due to the 
number of people on board and the added risk of explosion. However, the existing rules and regulations of collisions prevention are 
insufficient. The purpose of this article is to critically evaluate the risk of ships collisions with offshore platforms and installations and 
therefore propose an international regulation for the preventions of this type of collisions.  
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1. Introduction

 
The International Regulations for Preventing 
Collisions at Sea (1972) (COLREGs) have played a 
significant role in ensuring a safe navigation and 
operation of ships. However, offshore drilling 
platforms are excluded out of the system. With more 
and more offshore drilling platforms rising at sea, it has 
been a most urgent task to give a serious consideration 
on how to avoid collisions between offshore drilling 
platforms and ships [1].  
Accurate quantification of risks for ship collisions 
with oil rigs (S/O Collisions) has been a goal of the 
petroleum industry for many years; however, 
technological advances in collision avoidance  
systems have not been reflected in current      
models. Although, a major collision between   
passing merchant vessels and offshore platforms has 
not yet been experienced, the accident potential is 
significant. With every new hydrocarbon discovery, 
the risk of ship-platform collision increases. The 
platform operator has little influence over the collision 
potential beyond the selection of the platform‟s 
location. 
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2. Ship and Oil Rig Collision Accidents 
The consequences of any collisions with an oil rig, 
off shore installation or platform can be far more 
expensive in relation to safety, environment and costs 
of damage. As Fig. 1 shows, the damage due to a single 
incident of an ORC (Oil Rig Collision) can be 
catastrophic. This is because of two reasons: firstly, the 
increased risk of the live personnel due to the number 
of people on board; secondly, because of the added risk 
of explosion due to the highly flammable and explosive 
gases involved and the resultant costs and losses due to 
lost production.  
Platforms are designed to withstand smaller impacts 
from supply vessels, but passing vessels generally travel 
at higher speeds and consequently the displacement will 
likely to be greater than that of an attending vessel. Even 
at modest speeds, the inherent energy transfer to the 
platform can easily cause deformation of structural 
members and possibly a total failure [2]. Although only 
a small fraction of collisions recorded in the UKCS 
Ship/Platform Collision Incident Database involved 
passing vessels, the consequences of this type of 
accident are significant.  
Accurately modelling vessel-to-platform collision 
risk is a problem which has challenged the industry for 
over 20 years [3]. There are numerous social, technical, 
and environmental variables which influence the highly 
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Fig. 1  Ship collision with oil rig.  
 
Table 1  List of prominent oil rig disasters due to collisions.  
Name Year Location Damage and consequences 
Mumbai high north incident—collision with 
the multipurpose support vessel MV Samudra 
Suraksha 
2005 
Arabian sea (off Indian 
coast) 
Numerous fires and explosions, 22 lives lost, MHN 
oil platform and 1 helicopter completely destroyed, 
MV Samudra Suraksha sank 
Usumacinta jack up disaster 2007 
Gulf of Mexico (off the 
coast of United States of 
America) 
Fires on oil rig, 22 lives lost 
Collision between supply vessel MV Celeste 
Ann 
2013 Gulf of Mexico MV Celeste Ann sank 
Forties echo platform collision 2015 North sea Stopped production, 15 personnel evacuated 
 
complex interactions between the captain and the 
vessel [4].  
The past twenty years, numerous technological 
advancements have been achieved allowing the 
navigator to perform his job in a safer manner. The 
continuous improvement of safe practices, one path to 
catastrophe may be removed but new error 
opportunities and sequences to failure are introduced 
[5]. Table 1 explains several ship collisions with 
offshore installations.  
Swift [6] lists two principal reasons as the main 
causes of collisions and groundings at sea-weaknesses 
in bridge organisation and the failure to keep a good 
lookout. This is based on the International Safety 
Conference INTASAFCON III which was held in 
Norway in 1975. Since then, there has been a dramatic 
increase in the field of offshore oil exploration. Over 
the past thirty years, exploration in the off shore sector 
has increased steadily. 
Several organisations had begun in the early 1970‟s 
an effort to quantify the risks between ship-platform 
accidents. Technica was delegated, by the United 
Kingdom‟s DoE (Department of Energy), to carry out a 
study considering the evaluation of the risks collisions 
involving passing merchant vessels and off shore 
platforms on the UKCS (United Kingdom Continental 
Shelf) in 1981. A theoretical model was created from 
this study named CRASH and it was based on 
historical data and detailed survey of the UKCS 
shipping [7]. Following the CRASH‟s model other 
prevention collision models were developed as well 
from various organisations but without giving the 
desirable outcome, that of minimizing the accidents. 
The existing rules and regulations of accidents 
prevention and hopefully, the results will be used from 
the respective companies and organizations that are 
dealing with collision risk analysis providing guidance 
to the navigators. In other words, the justification of 
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this paper is to fill in the lack of knowledge and to 
contribute to the global governance by informing 
national and international policy makers with 
evidence-based data, analysis and a proposal as 
solution for a serious and growing safety and security 
problem at sea. 
3. Risk Assessment 
The working environment of an oil rig is extremely 
dangerous, which is surrounded by flammable and 
explosive gases. On board of the oil rigs are being 
implemented exceptionally high safety standards 
followed by preventive mechanisms like the blow out 
preventers. However, in the event of a collision, there is 
a fair probability of such safeties getting damaged. The 
collision accident of the M/V Samudra Suraksha and 
the MHN is an example of these probabilities, which 
led to multiple fires and explosions. Hence, the purpose 
of the safety on an oil rig is to reduce the risk of 
explosion that will lead to an incident or more so to an 
accident, but the impact of such a collision may 
eliminate the safeguard causing bigger problems to 
deal with. 
This makes a risk assessment of an oil rig collision a 
necessity. Making a risk assessment for an oil rig 
collision is an extremely complexed procedure, much 
more than a general risk assessment of the daily oil 
rig‟s activities. Also risk assessments of such collisions 
should be carried out and from the vessel‟s side while 
sailing in to designated areas with oil rigs like the 
North Sea. As a senior ship manger explained that in an 
interview: 
“Risk management is something seamen have 
always done. Seamen are very aware but seamen can be 
careless, tired and inexperienced. This business of 
formalising risks into checklists is a bit overdone. It is 
the caring supervision of ships operations by 
experienced DPA‟s actually sailing on the ships from 
time to time and having good internal audits that could 
overcome the navigational problems. The introduction 
of ECDIS will make this all more important. Risk 
assessment for a vigilant look out into these 
navigational waters must be implemented by the 
Company‟s SMS (Safety Management System) and 
must be carried out from the officers on board.”  
4. The Role of the Human Factor in 
Prevention of S/O Collisions 
Most of the incidents at sea are caused by the factor 
of the human error, according to Swift [6]. Following 
the opinion of Swift, Rothblum et al. [8] explained that 
about 75-96% of the marine casualties are caused, at 
least partially, by some form of human error. She 
further reiterates that casualties‟ human error 
contributes to 89-96% of the collisions at sea and  
84-88% of tanker accidents. The human error not only 
relates to any direct error made by a human being in 
control of decision making at the time of the accident, 
but also includes an error that may have led to it.  
Human error is described as: an incorrect decision, 
an improperly performed action, or an improper lack of 
action (inaction). Thus, a lack of awareness of the 
position of a rig may also be accounted for as a human 
error, and the corrective action in this case would be to 
a train concerned so as to improve his/her awareness. 
An error on the part of the VTIS operator would also be 
categorised as human error. Invariably, addressing any 
human error issues involves training and retraining. 
Procedural or regulatory failure refers to collisions that 
are caused due to lack of procedure/regulation or 
insufficient procedure/regulation. There is inadequate 
research upon this in the maritime domain, especially 
with respect to oil rig collisions. This research has 
focused on this aspect. 
4.1 Root Causes of S/O Collisions 
Always when an oil rig collision occurs multiple 
causes exist. The Norwegian Petroleum Safety 
Authority PSA (2011) states that 26 collisions occurred 
between vessels and off shore platforms for the period 
of 2000-2010. Many of the causes were deficient 
organisation, inadequate training, lack of experience, 
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failures of technical equipment. The Norwegian 
Petroleum Safety Authority PSA (2011) expresses the 
opinion that the following must be given more attention 
to prevent oil rig collisions [9]: 
 Training; 
 Organisational factors; 
 Attempts to reduce the technical failure rate; 
 Improvement in the quantification of the risk to 
collisions. 
At the same time PSA does not acknowledge the 
need for a change in the regulations. This research 
attempts to study whether a change in regulations can 
prevent such oil rig collisions. 
4.2 The Co-relation between Human Error and 
Improved Procedures/Relations 
It may often be difficult to clearly distinguish 
between human error and procedural failure. Often, 
good procedures can prevent human errors. For 
example: an oil rig collision by a passing vessel may be 
ascribed to human error if the watch keeper did not 
alter course sufficiently. However, a procedure (the 
establishment of clear traffic lanes for navigation) 
would have completely eliminated such human error.  
Thus, it can be argued that where human error has 
been identified as the cause of a collision, an improved 
procedure or regulation would be the appropriate 
preventive action. The DNV Loss causation model, 
used frequently in maritime accident investigation, also 
prescribes improved procedures as an effective 
preventive action. Such action always requires to be 
accompanied by dissemination of information. In the 
maritime sphere, this is largely carried out through 
training and education. 
The UK Maritime Coastguard Agency states that, 
any attempt to address the human element must take 
human abilities, limitations and weaknesses into 
account. This is enumerated in the UK MCA‟s Human 
Element Strategy. The term “human element” itself 
refers to different human and organisational factors 
that affect the ship‟s crew, the shore based organisation, 
regulatory organisations, people involved in ship 
design and construction, charterers, insurers, trainers, 
shipyard workers and accident investigators [10]. 
In this way, even when introducing a new regulation 
or when improving/amending an existing regulation, it 
is important for us to keep this human element in 
consideration. One method by which this can be 
ensured by the use of the principles of good design 
when introducing a system of preventing oil rig 
collisions. 
4.3 Improvement of Procedures and Regulations 
The authors believe that good design can also, to a 
large extent address such errors. As an example it could 
be the establishment of a traffic lane in the vicinity of 
an oil rig which can prevent close quarters situations 
with that oil rig, as compared to an oil rig that has no 
traffic lanes near it. Such design would eliminate 
certain forms of error. Rothblum et al. [8] refer to the 
use of “human centred design”. This design keeps the 
human operator topmost in mind when designing 
technologies, work environments and organisations, 
thus achieving three goals—supporting the human 
operator, fostering improved performance and 
minimising the risk of incidents and accidents [11, 12]. 
Such a design has been used also in other industries 
including those related to road development and 
transportation.  
4.4 Training as a Solution 
Naturally, such a solution will require building up 
awareness on the part of all personnel involved. A 
recommendation introduced in the vicinity of oil rigs is 
of little use if the mariners involved are not aware of it. 
This requires training and sometimes refresher training. 
As the UK‟s Secretary of State‟s Representative for 
Maritime Salvage and Intervention (SOSREP) shares 
the same opinion: 
“The importance of the human factor is obviously 
the most crucial of them all. The proper navigation is 
up to the navigation officer carrying his lookout. The 
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training that exists is sufficient for the mariners, but the 
frequency of the refreshing training isn‟t. Maybe we 
should focus also in the factor of the lack of rest due to 
the amount of work on board of a vessel. Perhaps 
additional navigation officers, may be plus one or two, 
to distribute the hours of navigation it would be all 
right.”  
5. Conclusion 
The collision between a navigational ship and an oil 
rig may be something with a small probability, but as 
this paper has shown that it might be a quite often event 
eventually. Until today, there is not any major accident 
with catastrophic consequences reported but the 
consequence that will occur from such an incident must 
be taken into consideration. As far as the provisions 
required in respect of watch keeping and collision 
prevention regarding the off shore drilling platforms, 
same are very scattered and unspecified yet. 
Unfortunately, the difficulty to find a complete and 
integrated rule to set a specific standard for regulating 
the actions of offshore drilling platforms, is very  
high.  
A first step would be to set up and carry out a proper 
statistic research, considering the likelihood of the 
accidents through an appropriate reporting system. 
Then, through the risk assessment process personnel 
from both sides (on board, shore staff) will be 
familiarized with possible incidents that may occur and 
the risk will be minimized, but not vanished. 
The difficult part is to persuade all stakeholders that 
there is a need for the renewal of the COLREGs in all 
aspects, in order to include the offshore 
platforms/installations and not to fall into the same 
regulations concerning the navigational ships, as 
previously. 
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